Article

Unbounded leakage-resilience and intrusion-detection in a quantum world

2024 IACR Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC 2024)

Alper Çakan; Vipul Goyal; João Ribeiro — 2024 — Springer

Key information

Authors:

Alper Çakan; Vipul Goyal; Chen-Da Liu Zhang; João Ribeiro (João Ribeiro)

Published in

November 28, 2024

Abstract

Can an adversary hack into our system and steal sensitive data such as cryptographic keys? This question is as old as the Internet and significant effort has been spent on designing mechanisms to prevent and detect hacking attacks. Once quantum computers arrive, will the situation remain the same or can we hope to live in a better world? We first consider ubiquitous side-channel attacks, which aim to leak side information on secret system components, studied in the leakage-resilient cryptography literature. Classical leakage-resilient cryptography must necessarily impose restrictions on the type of leakage one aims to protect against, such as the popular bounded leakage model. Although such leakage bounds are necessary, many real-world side-channel attacks cannot be captured by bounded leakage. In this work, we design cryptographic schemes that provide guarantees against arbitrary side-channel attacks: Using techniques from unclonable quantum cryptography, we design several basic leakage-resilient primitives, such as public- and private-key encryption, pseudorandom functions, digital signatures and quantum money schemes which remain secure under unbounded adaptive classical leakage over unbounded number of rounds. What if the adversary simply breaks into our system to steal our secret keys, rather than mounting only a side-channel attack? What if the adversary can even tamper with the data arbitrarily, for example to cover its tracks? We initiate the study of intrusion-detection in the quantum setting, where one would like to detect if security has been compromised even in the face of such attacks. We design cryptographic schemes supporting intrusion-detection for a host of primitives such as public- and private-key encryption, digital signature, functional encryption, program obfuscation and software protection. Our schemes are based on techniques from cryptography with secure key leasing and certified deletion.

Publication details

Authors in the community:

Publication version

P - Proof

Publisher

Springer

Link to the publisher's version

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-78017-2_6

Title of the publication container

2024 IACR Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC 2024)

First page or article number

159

Last page

191

Fields of Science and Technology (FOS)

computer-and-information-sciences - Computer and information sciences

Publication language (ISO code)

eng - English

Rights type:

Only metadata available